Hospital
surge capacity management of methanol poisoning in an Iranian hospital: A
case-study in Rafsanjan, Iran
Khodadadizadeh A, MSc1, Jahangiri K, PhD2*, Sharifian S, MSc3
1-
Faculty Member, School of Nursing, Rafsanjan University of Medical Sciences,
Rafsanjan, Iran. PhD Student in Health
in Emergency & Disaster, Shahid Beheshti University of Medical
Sciences, Tehran ,Iran, 2- Associate Prof., Dept. of emergencies, school
of Health, Safety and environment, Shahid Beheshti University of Medical Sciences,
Tehran, Iran. 3- PhD Student in Health in Emergency & Disaster, Shahid
Beheshti University of Medical Sciences, Tehran, Iran.
Abstract
Received: December
2015, Accepted: February
2016
Background:
Hospital surge capacity
(HSC) is essential to the successful management of expected consequences of
disasters and mass casualty incidents (MCIs). In
MCIs, an unanticipated number of sick or injured people refer to the
hospital, and thus, the hospital is faced with a significant increase in the
burden of necessary activities and services. Therefore, managing the process
in order to meet patients’ needs is critical. Mass poisoning is an emergency
event that requires HSC. The aim of the present study was to analyze the
activities performed to manage poisoning caused by oral consumption of
methanol in the summer of 2013 in Rafsanjan, Iran. Materials and
Methods: This was an empirical case study
consisting of various stages. The research environment was one of the
teaching hospitals in Rafsanjan. The target population included emergency
officials of the incident command system (ICS) and emergency operation center
(EOC), and the Deputy of Health in Rafsanjan University of Medical Sciences. Data were collected through review of documentation, internet resources,
observation, and deep interviews with officials. Framework Analysis was used for the analysis of qualitative data. Results: During this incident, 694 individuals referred to the hospital within 1
day; 361 patients were treated in Rafsanjan and 333 patients were referred for
treatment to other cities (Kerman, Zarand, Shahr Babak, Sirjan, Bardsir, and
Yazd).
In terms of HSC management, communication was better in
the 4Cs than other factors. In the 4Ss, the performance of staff was
acceptable, and in the 3Ts, the treatment and transference of poisoned
patients were evaluated as satisfactory and acceptable, respectively. Conclusions: According to the results of this study,
HSC in the event of methanol poisoning is inevitable. Therefore, attention to
and preparation for this issue in the response phase is very important. Hospitals should
identify their capacities in order to take appropriate action toward the
prevention of, preparation for, and response to an event. |
Keywords: Hospital, Surge Capacity, Methanol, Poisoning
Introduction
Usually
after an emergency or disaster, the large number of injured people leads to
casualty influx in health centers. In such situations, hospital surge capacity
(HSC) is essential to the successful management of mass casualty incidents
(MCIs) (1). HSC is the ability of a hospital to rapidly adjust to the increased
demand for hospital health services. This situation generally occurs after
natural and man-made disasters or any incident which causes mass casualties
(2).*Therefore, when our need for health services increase to higher
than the available resources and there is an imbalance between demand and
supply, HSC will emerge (2, 3). In such circumstances, optimal use of hospital
facilities, resource mobilization, triage system, and clinical and managerial
interventions are very important in order to control or stabilize the demand,
strengthen the referral system and the capacity of health care outside the
hospital, forecast and determine alternative treatment sites, and coordinate
all stakeholders and surveillance system activation (4).
The HSC depends on 4Cs including command,
control, communications, and coordination, 4Ss including space, staff, stuff,
and specialty, and 3Ts including triage, treatment, and transportation. HSC is
achieved through the provision of the 4Cs, 4Ss, and 3Ts (2). Therefore, HSC
includes physical space, organizational structure, medical staff, auxiliary
equipment, support (e.g., nutrition and mental health), information system, and
medicines (5). In HSC, knowledge of requirements of patient care is necessary (6).
Evidently, efficient response to casualty influx depends on appropriate
resource allocation (workforce and equipment). Resources should be allocated in
a way suitable for the treatment of the many victims and patients who refer to
the hospital after an emergency (7). In large-scale emergencies and disasters,
it is very difficult to provide services to patients (8). Thus, the ability to
respond to mass casualties should be included in hospital preparedness plan for
disasters which disrupt the daily activities of the hospital. HSC has another
category the components of which include staff, subject, structure, and system
(2). It
is not only important to increase the capacity of hospital services, but also
the mechanism of care due to impact of events (9, 10). This mechanism can
control the situation in time of a disaster and emergency (11). In MCIs, the
demand for health and health care facilities suddenly increases (12). Mass
poisoning that can be intentional or unintentional, is an example of situations
in which hospitals must increase their capacity. Poisoning may occur through
inhalation like chemical inhalation, oral intake like food poisoning, or dermal
intake like absorption of toxins and injection of drugs (in drug users). In
this study, food poisoning caused by drinking alcohol containing methanol, was
investigated. Methanol poisoning is a medical emergency that can cause acute
poisoning in a large number of people (13). Methanol is absorbed from the
gastrointestinal tract after oral administration and leads to methanol
poisoning; 30 ml of methanol can cause permanent blindness and 30 to 240 ml can
be potentially fatal (14). In the body, alcohol containing methanol will
transform into metabolic toxins such as formic acid during the metabolic
process, and then, metabolic acidosis, due to accumulation of formate, can
cause tissue hypoxia. High concentration of formate and lactate will cause
acidosis, and in turn, some clinical symptoms such as headache, dizziness,
nausea, vomiting, and abdominal pain. In advanced phases, visual disturbances,
gastrointestinal bleeding, seizures, pancreatitis, and coma will occur.
Intravenous administration of sodium bicarbonate to control metabolic acidosis,
ethanol as an antidote, and fomepizole and folic acid or folinic acid to
prevent the conversion of methanol to formate and rapid conversion of formate
to water and carbon dioxide are the treatment methods for methanol poisoning
(15).
This
study investigated the illegal distribution of methanol
in Rafsanjan, Iran, on 29/05/2013
that led to the transference of 694 casualties to Ali-ibn Abi Talib Hospital (with
mild to severe symptoms)
and caused HSC. The aim of this
study was to investigate the challenges
of managing SC in response to this
emergency in the hospital and determine
the strengths and weaknesses of the system to improve the system for similar
situations.
Material and Methods
This empirical, qualitative, case study was
implemented in 5 phases by reviewing recourses. The research environment was
the Ali-ibn Abi Talib Hospital in Rafsanjan. Data collection in different
phases was implemented through a variety of methods such as observation,
in-depth interviews, and review of documents, texts, and the internet. In the
first phase, a literature review was performed using keywords such as hospital
surge capacity and mass casualty incidence. As a result, 50 related articles
were extracted and among them 24 papers were selected. In the second phase, viewing
experiences by researchers were classified. In the third phase, a qualitative
study was designed, the participants of which were the officials of the
incident command system (ICS) and emergency operation
center (EOC) and the Deputy of health of the University of Rafsanjan. The data
were collected through 10 in-depth interviews, each one lasting 15-20 minutes.
In the fourth phase,
Framework Analysis was used for data analysis. Framework Analysis consists of 5 steps
including familiarization, identification
of a thematic framework, indexing, charting, and
mapping and interpretation.
The 4 criteria of acceptability, transferability, reliability, and verifiability
were used to ensure the validity,
accuracy, and reliability
of the data. In the fifth phase,
some strategies were proposed to
respond to such events.
Result
Rafsanjan
is a city in Kerman Province. According to the 2012 census, its population was
151,420. This city is adjacent to Zarand from the North, Shahr Babak from the
West, Sirjan from Southwest, Bardsir from the South, and Kerman from the East.
The distance between Rafsanjan and Kerman is 110 Km (16). Rafsanjan has three
hospitals, Ali-ibn Abi Talib, Moradi, and Niknafas Maternity Hospital. The
Ali-ibn Abi Talib Hospital was founded in 1987 and has 300 approved beds. This
hospital has 200 active beds and is located in the south of the city. This
hospital has different departments such as surgical wards for men and women,
the internal and neurosurgical wards, pediatrics ward, neonatal ward, intensive
care unit (ICU), coronary care unit (CCU), neonatal intensive care unit (NICU),
dialysis unit, cardiac intensive care unit (CICU), angiography, operating room,
emergency department, and etcetera. This hospital can cover a population of
200,000 individuals. The hospital has four entrance and exit doors. The doors
on the East side of the hospital are for traffic of administrative personnel,
doctors, and students. The door on the Northwest side of the hospital is for
the entrance of patients. The emergency department includes trauma emergency,
inpatient and outpatient emergency, and triage. This department has the
capacity for providing services to 80-90 inpatients and 240-270 outpatients in
24 hours (17).
The
first casualty due to alcohol intoxication (chronology of the events listed in
table 1) was brought to the emergency department of Ali-ibn Abi Talib Hospital
by ambulance at 21:37 p.m. on 29/05/2013. After emergency treatment by the
health team and interviews with the patient’s family, alcohol poisoning and
methanol poisoning were detected. On 30/05/2013, the other 2 casualties were
brought to the emergency department at 7:38 a.m. Despite receiving treatment,
one of them died and the other was hospitalized. A new case was also referred
to the department at 8:45 a.m. At this point, the medical team such as
physicians, emergency medicine doctors, and triage personnel predicted that the
number of casualties might increase, so they decided to inform the EOC of the
university. The number of casualties was growing. At 12 a.m., a meeting was
held between law enforcement officers, the attorney general of province, head
of the university and hospital, and the provincial governor. EOC was activated
at 13 p.m. The hospital staff were called to the emergency department at 13:15
p.m. The health care team consisted of 4 emergency specialists, and 4 emergency
physicians, nurses of the emergency department, and disaster teams.
Table
1: The chronology of the methanol poisoning incident
Time
of casualty arrival |
Number
of casualties |
Responsible
for transfer |
Measures |
21:37 p.m. 29/05/2013 |
1 |
115 |
Diagnosis
of methanol poisoning and starting treatment |
7:38 a.m. 30/05/2013 |
2 |
115 |
Diagnosis
of methanol poisoning and starting treatment One
of them was hospitalized and the other died |
12 a.m. 30/05/2013 |
- |
- |
Health Working Group meeting |
1 p.m. 30/05/2013 |
|
|
Regional
EOC was activated |
1:15
p.m. 30/05/2013 |
|
|
Calling of staff
to the emergency department |
2:30
p.m. 30/05/2013 |
26 |
115,and patient’s families |
Evaluation, diagnosis, and treatment
through dialysis due to metabolic acidosis |
3 p.m. 30/05/2013 |
|
115 |
The
first service of
transferring patients to Kerman |
4
p.m. 30/05/2013 |
|
|
Implementation
of detection and screening protocols, encouragement of patients to find their
drinking partners in Rafsanjan via short message service (SMS), and frequent
broadcasting of messages and announcements via the local radio of Rafsanjan
and the megaphone of health centers |
5
p.m. 30/05/2013 |
|
|
|
until
night |
694 |
|
Provision
of care to 361 individuals in Rafsanjan and transference of
333 individuals to hospitals of other cities such as Zarand, Shahr Babak,
Sirjan, Bardsir, Baft and Yazd |
6
a.m. 31/05/2013 |
|
|
Discharging
of most outpatients without
and problems Provision of hemodialysis treatment to
175 cases of poisoning |
03/06/2013 |
|
|
EOC deactivation |
EOC: Emergency operation center
At 14:30 p.m., the number of
casualties rose to 26 individuals.
Many of them were suffering from severe metabolic
acidosis and required dialysis.
Therefore, the hospital did not have the capacity for the growing number of
casualties. At 15 p.m., some patients were referred to
other facilities. At 16 p.m., a screening protocol was activated through
encouraging the patients to find their drinking partners and inform them via
short message service (SMS), and making announcements through the local radio
of Rafsanjan and via the local public health center. After starting the screening protocol, the
number of patients in the emergency department of Ali-ibn Abi Talib Hospital
(even with minor symptoms) increased (18). After this valuable early warning
and public announcement, all 24 ambulances of the emergency center and 3 bus
ambulances were used. All operations were controlled by the Incident Commander
of the ICS.
After the public announcement, the number of casualties
rose to 694 individuals. Thus, 361 individuals received care in Rafsanjan, and 333 individuals were
transferred to hospitals of other cities such as Zarand, Shahr Babak, Sirjan,
Bardsir, Baft, and Yazd. The main indication for
hemodialysis (HD) was resistant metabolic acidosis; therefore, 175
individuals received hemodialysis. The number of inpatients and outpatients was
194 and 500, respectively. In addition, care was provided by
4 emergency specialists, and 4 emergency practitioners, nurses
of the emergency department, and disaster teams. However, 8 patients died. Except serum of deceased cases, there was no evidence of the
level of methanol in serum (18). Regarding HSC, the strengths and weaknesses of the hospital are
reported below.
Table 2: Characteristics of surge capacity from the perspective of 4Cs in the hospital
Command |
Control |
Communication |
Coordination |
||||
+ |
_ |
+ |
_ |
+ |
_ |
+ |
_ |
|
The
duties of the manager of each section were not clear and this caused
duplication and confusion. |
The
security department of the hospital functioned well. |
There
was no plan for management of VIPs such as representatives of the provincial
governor and attorney, police, and the press and media, and this caused some
problems in providing services. |
The
reporting and recording of the health team in the ICS was satisfactory. |
|
Coordination
in ICS was satisfactory. |
According
to the hospital protocols, the HICS was not well coordinated. |
|
All
command staff had been called onto the scene, while they should have stayed
in the command center. |
|
Entering
and exiting of ambulances was very difficult, because they entered through
the same door as patients and their families. |
|
|
|
There
was no activation program. |
Over time, the
hospital personnel were familiarized with the EOC and its duties. |
At
first, the hospital personnel had no familiarity with the EOC and its duties |
|
|
|
|
|
|
HICS: Hospital incident command system; ICS:
Incident command system; EOC: Emergency operation center
From
the perspective of the 4Cs (Table 2):
1.
Coordination in ICS was satisfactory, but the duties of the manager of each
section were not clear and this caused duplication and confusion.
2.
There was no activation plan.
3. At
first, the hospital personnel had no familiarity with the EOC and its duties,
but after this incident, this problem was resolved.
4. On
the first day, measures were not taken according to the disaster management
protocols of the hospital, but team coordination in all levels was
satisfactory.
5. All
command staff had been called onto the scene, while they should have stayed in
the command center.
6. The
reporting and recording of the health team of the ICS was satisfactory.
7.
According to the hospital protocols, the hospital incident command system
(HICS) was not well coordinated.
8.
There was no plan for management of VIPs such as representatives of the
provincial governor and attorney, police, and the press and media, and this
caused some problems in providing services.
9. The
security department of the hospital functioned well, but entering and exiting
of ambulances was very difficult because they entered through the same door as
patients and their families.
Table 3: Characteristics of surge capacity from the perspective of 4Ss in the hospital
Space |
staff |
Stuff |
Specialty |
||||
+ |
_ |
+ |
_ |
+ |
_ |
+ |
_ |
|
Lack
of space for inpatients and outpatients due to the emergency department
structure |
Timely
presence of the medical teams |
|
Satisfactory
provision of medicines and supplies |
Lack
of ID badges for the identification of patients. |
|
Lack
of estimation of the probable number of patients |
|
Lack
of a multi-purpose space for use in disasters |
Sufficient qualified
personnel in the emergency department |
|
|
Lack
of computers and HIS (hospital information system) port in the emergency department for
registration |
|
|
|
Lack
of a discharge plan for elective patients in the hospital |
Suitable
coordination between the medical teams |
|
|
Lack
of dialysis machine and transference of patients to other cities |
|
|
|
Lack
of space for triage |
|
|
|
Lack
of ICU beds |
|
|
|
The
lack of space for patients’ families |
|
|
|
Lack
of laboratory equipment to diagnose metabolic acidosis caused by methanol |
|
|
|
Lack
of space for the personnel and patients’ family members |
|
|
|
|
|
|
ICU: Intensive care unit
From
the perspective of the 4Ss (Table 3):
1. Timely presence of the medical teams.
2. Sufficient
qualified personnel in the emergency department
3. Suitable
coordination between medical teams
4. Satisfactory
provision of medicines and supplies
5. Lack of ID badges
for the medical team and incidence team
6. Lack of ID badges for
identification of patients
7. Lack of computers
and HIS (hospital information system) port in the emergency department for
registration
8. Lack of dialysis
machine and transference of patients to other cities
9. Lack of space for
inpatients and outpatients due to the emergency department structure
10. Lack of ICU beds
11. Lack of a
discharge plan for elective patients in the hospital
12. Lack of a
multi-purpose space for use in disasters.
13. Lack of
laboratory equipment to diagnose metabolic acidosis caused by methanol
14. Lack of space for
triage
15. Lack of space for
patients’ families
16. Lack of space for
the personnel and patients’ family members
17. Lack of
estimation of the probable number of patients
From
the perspective of the 3Ts (Table 4):
1. Unsuitable triage of patients because of influx of patients
and their families in the first hours (the problem was resolved with the
transference of the triage space to outside the emergency department)
2. Failure to separate outpatient and inpatient admissions (the
problem was resolved on the second day)
3. Failure to complete the registration of patients
4. Satisfactory transference and transportation in the
pre-hospital phase
5. Timely performance of treatment of patients by the medical team
6. Satisfactory and fast transference of patients to other cities
by ambulance and coordination
Table 4: Characteristics of surge
capacity from the perspective of 3Ts in the hospital
Triage |
Treat |
Transport |
|||
+ |
_ |
+ |
_ |
+ |
_ |
The
problem was resolved with the transference of the triage space to outside the
emergency department |
Unsuitable
triage of patients because of influx of patients and their families in the
first hours |
Timely
performance of treatment of patients by the medical team |
|
Satisfactory
transference and transportation in the pre-hospital phase |
|
The
problem was resolved on the second day |
Failure
to separate outpatient and inpatient admissions |
|
|
Satisfactory and fast
transference of patients to other cities by ambulance and coordination |
|
|
Failure
to complete the registration of patients |
|
|
|
|
Discussion
Despite
effective treatment of methanol poisoning, unfortunately its mortality rate is
high (19). In Islamic countries, due to legal prohibition of the sale and
distribution of alcohol, methanol poisoning is caused by handmade drinks. In
Iran, methanol poisoning is becoming a serious problem for the health care
system. The majority of consumers of alcoholic drinks are young individuals
(18). On the other hand, because of Iran’s religious and legal restrictions,
the rate of alcohol poising is increased due to increased use of substandard
alcohol (18, 20).
The methanol poisoning incident in Rafsanjan was an unexpected event for the city and
the healthcare system. However, it must be considered, because of the probability of
reoccurrence in other cities. Therefore, there are very
valuable experiences in this incident from the perspective of HSC. In
order to develop a disaster response plan in hospitals, the following steps
should be taken: 1. identifying the hospital to respond to the disaster; 2.
determining the total number of patients, to which the hospital can provide
services; 3. planning for training qualified staff for critical situations; 4.
planning for equipment and supplies; 5.
planning for the treatment area and the route for transporting the stretchers; 6. planning for the development of a
family information center (FIC); 7. Creating a staff calling plan; 8, Creating
the HICS; 9, Creating an activation plan; and 10, Planning for standard
training (21). In this incident, due to unfamiliarity with the circumstances,
the necessary measures could not be predicted, but many shortcomings were
resolved quickly during the response.
Hospitals should have plans for spaces to accommodate an
influx of victims and injured individuals. Spaces for triage, registration of
patients, caring for patients, operation rooms for trauma and fracture cases,
recovery rooms, and a decontamination center are necessary in hospitals. In all
natural or manmade incidents, the demand for hospital services is increased;
therefore, the HICS including incident commander and other posts in the command
center should be activated. (22). In this incident, there was not enough space
for triage. Coordination of EOC and ICS was not satisfactory, because the
hospital personnel did not have any previous exercise.
In such incidents, the hospital manager should
cancel some elective services, plan for discharging some patients to increase
the number of available hospital beds, identify an alternate care site and
external care site for transferring patients, maximize the capacity of medical
triage and treatment, and install tents as required (8). To create an
appropriate space for emergency department triage, some protocols should be
developed such as a protocol for discharging patients or alternate care sites
in the hospital like the conference hall and post-ICU unit, or outside the
hospital like other hospitals or nursing homes. Alternative elective outpatient
care spaces could be suitable for outpatient triage. First, all hospital spaces
should be identified. In planning for surge capacity, spaces for family members
and family support center, supportive care and patient tracking, media,
satellite communication system, behavioral care unit, resting of staff and
patients’ families, and gathering of personnel are important. There was no plan
before this incident, but the triage process was facilitated over time.
In order to overcome the shortage of human
resources, the hospital manager should consider planning for staff surge
capacity, job rotation, strategies for staff maintenance, planning for access
to expert staff inside and outside the hospital, and planning for calling the
staff (activation of an alert code). In this incident, there was no report of
malfunction of EOC or calling of staff or failure in screening of metabolic
acidosis in emergency departments (8, 18, 21). Active screening (encouraging
patients to find their drinking partners in Rafsanjan via SMS and frequent
broadcasting of messages and announcements via the local radio of Rafsanjan)
was a valuable experience that can be used in similar events.
In
order to coordinate, command, and control an incident, the hospital manager
should integrate the principles of the
incident management system in the hospital, develop manuals for different
processes, improve coordination between hospitals and medical centers and
emergency services, improve the compatibility of IMS with national strategies,
plan for achieving resource and resource mobilization, develop a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) with the main stakeholders about the hospitals contribution fund (HCF) (provide
medical support, supplies, referral system, coordination, and etcetera) (4,
23).
Furthermore,
providing survival equipment, maximizing all logistic and financial resources,
providing blood and blood products and donors, sharing resources with private
and public hospitals, providing protective equipment, procuring materials and
equipment for all kinds of casualties, including airway, endotracheal
intubation, ambo bags and masks, chest tube insertion devices, drugs such as
diazepam and morphine, atropine, disposable devices like catheters clothes,
reusable items such as beds, IV pumps, devices for measuring blood pressure,
procuring materials and equipment to take care of patients who need specialized
care, anti-bacterial drugs, intravenous fluids, needles for injection, special
plaster for casting and etcetera, procuring personnel protection equipment, `medications, antibodies, anti-virus,
vaccines, other risk reduction strategies such as ultraviolet rays, ventilator,
and etcetera, providing water, food, supplies such as office desks, chairs,
pencils, calculators, pens, erasers, sewing machines, and glue, communication
devices such as telephone, fax, and mobile, and providing oxygen cylinders,
manometer, masks, and etcetera are very important in preparing for surge
capacity.
In surge capacity management, managers should
plan for communication and coordination with private hospitals, recourse
sharing, and access to external resources such as military services and the
private sector (4). In this incident, due to lack of prediction,
there was a lack of resources such as ICU beds and dialysis machine. Therefore,
due to these shortcomings, many patients were transferred to other hospitals.
External coordination with the police and other institutions was satisfactory,
while the internal coordination had some problems. Each organization acted
according to their protocol; thus, a unified command and reporting protocol are
very important in such incidents.
A definition of public health is
improvement of the quality of individual interaction with the community and the
welfare of the society and the final result of this interaction is the
promotion of social capital and social security, and reduction of poverty and
inequality. Alcohol and drug abuse are social disorders and have negative
impact on economic, social, cultural, and health systems (24). Hence, a
comprehensive plan is required with the cooperation of other organizations in
our society.
Conclusion
HSC in the event of
methanol poisoning is inevitable.
Thus, attention to this issue and preparation
for it is very important in the response phase. In this regard, preparation of executive program, guidelines for exposure to a variety of incidents, determination of hospitals or medical centers and equipping them commensurate with threatening hazards, and personnel training can prepare hospitals to deal with these events. Moreover, designing and implementation of the maneuver, training skilled volunteers, coordination with other provinces through a systematic referral system, and other measures that can be implemented.
Acknowledgements
The authors wish to
thank the ECO secretary of Rafsanjan University of Medical
Sciences, the emergency staff of the Deputy of Health in Rafsanjan
University of Medical Sciences, and all their colleagues at the
university who assisted in the
performance of this study.
Conflict of interests: None declared.
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* Corresponding author: Katayoun Jahangiri, Dept. of emergencies, school of Health,
Safety and environment, Shahid Beheshti University of Medical Sciences, Tehran,
Iran
Email: katayounjahangiri@yahoo.com