Fire and explosion risk assessment in
a chemical company by the application of DOW fire and explosion index
Zarranejad
A, PhD1, Ahmadi O, MSc2*
1- PhD in Occupational Health Engineering, Dept
of. Sciences of Occupational Health, Tarbiat
Modares University, Tehran, Iran. 2- MSc in Occupational Health Engineering, Dept. of Sciences of Occupational Health, Tarbiat
Modares University, Tehran, Iran.
Abstract
Received:
April 2016, Accepted:
July
2016
Background: Fire and explosion hazards are extremely important
in processing units. This study was performed to identify the risk
centers, the potential
damage caused by fire and explosion,
and the days of production cessation in the processing company. Materials and Methods: The present qualitative
case study was
conducted using Dow’s index in 2015.
The fire and explosion hazard index and level
were calculated for the
processing units after collecting the required data.
In addition, hazard radius and level,
damage factor (DF), actual maximum probable
property damage (MPPD), and
the maximum probable days’ outage (MPDO) were determined by analysis of the collected data. Results: The results indicated that the fire and explosion hazard level was high in 82% of
the studied processing units. Moreover, the potential fire or explosion could cause
financial damage of 51 million dollars and production
cessation of 296 days. Conclusions: The results of
this study showed a variety of possible fire and explosion hazards in the
studied processing units. By determining several weakness points in these
units, serious engineering controls were suggested to decrease the determined
hazard levels. Furthermore, Dow’s fire and explosion index (F&EI) was approved as an efficient technique for assessing
the risk of fire or explosion in addition to their damage levels. |
Keywords: Explosion, Fire, Chemical, Index.
Introduction
Chemical and processing units are
at risk of fire and explosion due to a variety of reasons including fire
hazards, chemical reactivity, and leakage of materials. Catastrophic events,
production cessation, and damage to the equipment and organizational investments
may occur due to the lack of accurate recognition and assessment of these
hazards. The accidents that occurred in the Flixborough
chemical complex (England), Pasadena chemical complex (USA), Mexico City LPG Terminal,
Feyzin Refinery (France), and Piper Alpha Oil
Production Platform can be given as examples of these catastrophic events. Therefore,
the mentioned hazards should be identified, assessed, and controlled to ensure
the security of the processing industries (1).
Towards this goal, the processes
of recognition and risk assessment of fire and explosion hazards have been
performed through different methods. The occurrence of various accidents
induced by fire and explosion hazards indicates that the classical techniques
of risk assessment are not effective enough due to the unspecialized point of
view to the risk assessment processes. Thus, accurate and dexterous methods are*
required to identify and assess fire and explosion risks from a specialized
viewpoint. Dow’s Fire and Explosion Index (F&EI) has been recently
developed to identify and investigate fire and explosion hazards. This index
(which does not require high levels of specialty and details) calculates the
general risks of processing units through a simple and comprehensive method.
This method is based on
historical loss data, the energy potential of materials, and the extent to
which loss prevention practices are currently applied. Dow uses numerical
values of hazard factors associated with different material and process
characteristics to determine fire and explosion hazards in a step-by-step
objective evaluation. Therefore, incorporation of such a method (especially for
recognizing the critical points) is indispensable due to its key advantages
including economic identification, saving time and concentration on the fire
and explosion control activities in important and critical sections. In
addition to the investigation and quantification of total effective parameters
in fire and explosion occurrence, Dow’s index can efficiently assess other
useful information such as the maximum amount of potential damage, maximum days
of production cessation in probable explosion and fire (2,
3). The main aim of this method was
not to classify the facilities into safe and unsafe categories; however, a
relative ranking of hazards and risks in an organization can be provided (4).
The F&EI was designed by Dow and the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) in 1967. This method has since been revised six
times. Its last revision (7th edition) was published by Suardin (5). Etowa
et al. developed a computer program based on this method to automate F&EI
calculation (6). Different researches have been conducted
on the incorporation of this method in different applications. Etowa et al. employed this method to investigate the
inherent safety of reservoirs used for storing methyl isocyanate(6). Rigas et al. performed a comprehensive
study for the safety analysis of a new production line in a pesticide factory
in Northern Italy using Dow’s method(7) In this regard, Suardin (5) and Hendershot(8) can also be studied.
Moreover, Ahmadi et al. conducted
a study for the rational ranking of fire and explosion hazards in a petrochemical
industry (9). The quantitative determination
of fire and explosion risk in a processing unit was also performed by Ahmadi et
al. (10).
The main aims of the present
study were to identify fire and explosion hazards and assess the induced risk
in a processing company. Other goals of the study were to predict the maximum probable
damage and determine the maximum number of days of production cessation using Dow’s
F&EI, and to present appropriate control guidelines.
Material and Methods
The present qualitative case
study was performed on a processing company (in Southern Iran) in 2015 using Dow’s
F&EI. Dow’s index was first introduced in 1964 by a chemical materials
production company named Dow. It has since then been revised 6 times and the
last version was presented in 1994. Dow’s F&EI (as one of the specific and
useful methods for risk assessment and evaluation of the damage induced by fire
and explosion in processing industries) has provided an appropriate framework
for identification and assessment of fire and explosion damages. It has also
provided effective ways for controlling of the identified hazards. This method
calculates the risks of fire and explosion hazard in processing units in a simple,
fast, and comprehensive way. Moreover, it does not require high level of
specialty and process details(11,
12).
The implementation process of the
present study is defined in the following stages.
Preliminary
data collection: In the first stage, the
required information were obtained for coordinates of units’ installation and
location, equipment, and the main piping routes and cables by investigation of
the plot plan. In addition, the required information on the schematic view of
the studied system, the flow between the principal system elements, and the
basic design, such as quantity and quality of the utilized materials in the processes,
were collected by investigating the process flow diagrams (PFDs). The required detailed
information on the relationship between the parts, machines, valves, fittings,
and other mechanical parts were determined using piping and instrumentation diagrams/drawings
(P&IDs) (3).
Processing
units: After the preliminary data collection and familiarization
with the processes, the studied company was classified into processing units.
In this study, the processing unit was defined as an element from the
processing equipment that could be investigated as an independent system such
as reactor, distillation column, absorption tower, compressor, pump, furnace, and
reservoir. Any identified processing unit was then accurately investigated in
terms of stock materials, the materials’ potential chemical energy, operational
conditions, records of past damages, and its potential ability to stop the
production. The effects of the mentioned parameters were investigated on the
whole process regarding fire and explosion to select those processing units
that had severe adverse effects on the process (2,
3).
Material
factor (MF): In this stage, the quantitative and qualitative
characteristics of the chemicals were determined, and based on that, the
material factors were calculated for each processing unit. Material factor can
be defined as the material’s emission intensity and release of potential energy
which may be calculated by considering its flammability and
reactivity. The material factor usually ranges from 1 to 40 and can be
determined based on standards NFPA-325M and NFPA-49 considering material
flammability (NF) and reactivity (NR).
The
calculated parameter is the base factor representing the hazard level at surrounding
environment’s temperature and pressure conditions. The material factors were
revised because the environmental conditions differed from the processing conditions
in the studied units. Since, several materials were usually used in each
processing unit, the maximum values between the calculated material factors
were considered according to the weight percentage of the material(3,
11).
Process
general hazards factor: In this
stage, the process’s general hazards (which are generally classified into 6
main categories) were identified. Since existence of these hazards in
processing units could induce the risk of fire and explosion, a specific
penalty value was assigned for each of the identified hazards according to table
1. Clearly, the higher levels of hazards induced received higher penalty. Furthermore,
the penalty value was ignored if there was no hazard. Finally, the total values
of the assigned penalties were calculated for the identified hazards and process
general hazards factor (F1) was obtained for the processing units by
addition of 1 to its value (2,
3).
Table 1: General process hazards and corresponding penalties
Penalty
value |
Description |
General
process hazards (F1or GPHs) |
0.30 |
Mild
reactions such as hydrogenation, hydrolysis, isomerization,
sulfating, and neutralization |
Exothermic
chemical processes |
0.50 |
Moderate
reactions such as alkylation, esterification,
oxidation, polymerization, condensation, and incremental reactions |
|
1.00 |
Severe
reactions within which the control of reaction conditions was difficult and
critical such as halogenation |
|
1.25 |
Sensitive
exothermic chemical processes such as nitration |
|
0.20 |
Endothermic
chemical reactions that occurred in the reactor |
Endothermic
chemical processes |
0.40 |
Endothermic
chemical reactions that occurred in the reactors and their energy sources
were provided from combustion of solid, liquid, and gas fuels such as lime
production (calcination) and materials pyrolysis induced by direct contact with fire |
|
0.50 |
Performance
of loading and unloading of grade one flammable liquids and liquid
pressurized gases (LPG) in one way in a continuous or discontinuous way |
Manual
handling, transportation and material warehousing |
0.50 |
Those
processes within which the detonative mixes may appear during material
addition (induced by contact with air) or other reactivity hazards may be
revealed such as centrifuge, discontinuous or interrupted reactions, and
modular mixing. |
|
The
following penalties have been applied according to the materials in cases in
which they were stored in roofed warehouses or outdoor environment (unroofed
warehouses). |
||
0.85 |
Flammable
gases or liquids with NF = 3 or 4 |
|
0.65 |
Volatile
solids with NF = 3 |
|
0.40 |
Volatile
solids with NF = 2 |
|
0.65 |
Flammable
liquids with 140 ºF/60 ºC < FPclosed
cup > 100 ºF/37.8 ºC |
|
Note:
The penalty value was increased by 0.2 if the mentioned materials were stored
in racks lacking rack sprinkler. |
||
0.50 |
In
cases in which the filters or dust collectors were in a closed area |
Enclosed/closed
or internal processing units |
0.30 |
Processes
within which flammable liquids were incorporated in temperatures higher than
their flash points |
|
0.45 |
In
cases in which the flammable liquid mass was higher than 10 Mlb |
|
0.60 |
Processes
within which LPG or flammable liquids were incorporated in temperatures
higher than their boiling point |
|
0.90 |
In
cases in which the liquid weight was more than 10000 lb (equal to 1000
American gallons) |
|
Note:
The penalty values were decreased up to 50% if appropriate ventilation
systems were installed for the above mentioned cases. |
||
0.35 |
In
cases of inappropriate accessibility to the processing regions with area of
more than 10000 ft2 (925 m2) |
Accessibility |
0.35 |
In
case of inappropriate accessibility to the warehouses with area of more than
25000 ft2 (2312 m2) |
|
In
processes within which flammable materials were incorporated in flash points
of above 140 ºF or for materials that were employed in process condition
above their flash point if |
Drainage
and leakage control |
|
0.50 |
Barrier
walls existed which surrounded the equipment capable of causing fire |
|
0.50 |
A
flat area existed near the processing unit which facilitated the materials
leakage development and exposed the region to high risk of fire |
|
0.00 |
Barrier
walls existed that surrounded the processing unit from three sides which
guided the leaked materials to a discharge pool or covered drainage canal |
|
0.50 |
Pools
or discharge canals in a processing unit passing telephone and electricity
lines specified regions or the safe distances from these lines were not
considered in processing unit design |
Process-specific
hazards factor: The process-specific hazards
factor (F2) (that is classified into 12 main categories) was
identified in this stage. A certain penalty value was considered for any
identified hazards according to the manual indicated in table 2 by considering
the risk of fire and explosion that may be caused by these hazards. The penalty
value was increased for higher levels of process-specific hazards. Finally, the
total penalties assigned to the identified process-specific hazards were
calculated, and by addition of +1 to its value, factor F2 was
obtained for processing units (2, 3).
Processing
unit hazards factor: The hazards factor of the
processing units (F3) was calculated using the following equation (3):
Table 2: Specific process hazards and corresponding penalties
Penalty
value |
Description |
Specific
process hazards (F2 or SPHs) |
||||||||
|
-
|
Toxic
materials |
||||||||
0.50 |
Processes
that were performed at absolute pressure of below 500 mmHg or processes that
are hazardous due to leakage of air into them |
Pressure
below the barometric pressure |
||||||||
0.50 |
-
Flammable
liquid reservoirs with flammability degree (NF) of 3 or 4 that air could
enter into during sudden cooling or removal of its contents -
Open gates and
vacuum pressure relief systems where no gas emission was observed during
their application -
Storage of flammable
liquids in conditions that were above their flash points (in sealed
containers) |
Operation
at (or near to) the flammable limits |
||||||||
0.00 |
-
A vapor
recovery system with corresponding airlocks |
|||||||||
0.30 |
-
Processing
units or reservoirs in which processing conditions were at or near the
flammability limits (just in case a fault was observed in tools and
equipment) |
|||||||||
Penalty factor |
Taylor mesh size |
Particle sizes |
Processing
units which generate dust such as material handling, materials mixing,
grinding, and packing (The
penalty value is determined according to the particles and mesh size.) |
Dust
explosion |
||||||
0.25 |
60-80 |
> 175 |
||||||||
0.50 |
80-100 |
150-175 |
||||||||
0.75 |
100-150 |
100-150 |
||||||||
1.25 |
150-200 |
75-100 |
||||||||
2.00 |
> 200 |
< 75 |
||||||||
In
processing units which were working above the barometric pressure, the
penalty value was determined based on the operational pressure. |
Relief
pressure |
|||||||||
For
pressure limit of 1000 psig, the penalty value was determined using the
following equation: |
||||||||||
Penalty value |
Pressure (psig) |
For
pressure of more than 1000 psig |
||||||||
0.86 |
1000 |
|||||||||
0.92 |
1500 |
|||||||||
0.96 |
2000 |
|||||||||
0.98 |
2500 |
|||||||||
1.00 |
3000-1000 |
|||||||||
1.50 |
> 10000 |
|||||||||
In
processes within which the temperature may decrease to lower than transition
point because of normal or abnormal operational conditions. |
Low
temperature |
|||||||||
0.30 |
- Hard steel was used or the
operational conditions were at or below the transition temperature (soft a.nd flexible/brittle and fragile) |
|||||||||
0.20 |
- Materials other than steel
were used or the operational conditions was at or below the transition
temperature |
|||||||||
Having the potential heat transfer value (in BTU) the penalty factor was determined using the following equation: |
The
first category (the liquids and gases existing in the process) which consist
of flammable
liquids with flash points below 140 ºF (60 ºC) and flammable gases,
flammable liquid gases, and flammable liquids with flash points above 140
ºF (60 ºC) |
Flammable
and unstable materials |
||||||||
The
second category (liquids and gases stored in the reservoir) which were
located outside the processing region consisted of |
||||||||||
|
1.
Liquid gases |
|||||||||
|
2.
Class I flammable liquids (with flash points below 100
ºF/37.8 ºC) |
|||||||||
|
3.
Class II flammable liquids (100 ºF/37.8 ºC < FP
< 140 ºF/60 ºC) |
|||||||||
The
third category contained volatile solids in the inventory or the dust created
in the process. The considered penalty value depends on the amount of
materials in the inventory. |
||||||||||
|
1.
Materials with a density above |
|||||||||
|
1.
Materials with a density below |
|||||||||
The
amount of corrosion was defined as the summation of the internal and external
corrosion degrees |
Corrosion
and wear |
|||||||||
0.10 |
Corrosion
below 0.5 in/year (0.127 mm/year) |
|||||||||
0.20 |
Corrosion
above 0.5 in/year (0.127 mm/year)
and below 1 mm/year |
|||||||||
0.2 |
Corrosion
above 1 in/year (0.254 mm/year) |
|||||||||
0.75 |
The
risk of cracking existed due to the corrosion stress |
|||||||||
0.20 |
Special
coatings were used for prevention of corrosion |
|||||||||
0.40 |
Processing
units that incorporate materials with natural penetration capability or
abrasive watery solutions which cause various problems in equipment sealing.
Processes that used detachable seals |
Leakage
induced by fittings and sealing washers |
||||||||
1.50 |
Processing
units with optical glass and expansion joints |
|||||||||
0.10 |
Pumps
and seals with slight leakage |
|||||||||
0.30 |
Pumps,
compressors and flange fittings with continuous leakage |
|||||||||
0.10 |
processes
with pressurized and thermal cycles |
|||||||||
Processing
units which are placed near heaters with flame or themselves have flamed
heaters The
considered penalty values depend on the distance between the heater and the
potential leakage point (in ft) which may be calculated using following
equations: |
Equipment
with flames (burning equipment) |
|||||||||
|
Processing
units with potential emission of materials employed above their flash point Processing
units within which flammable dust is incorporated |
|||||||||
|
Processing
units within which the probability of emission of materials above their
boiling points exists |
|||||||||
0.00 |
Hot
oil heat exchangers were assessed as an independent process. The
utilized hot oil is not flammable or is utilized below its flash point |
Hot
oil heat exchangers |
||||||||
Penalty value |
The
penalty value for processing units using hot oil heat exchangers or flammable
hot oil |
|||||||||
Oils used above boiling point |
Oils used above flash point |
Volume (m2) |
Amount of oil (American gallon) |
|
||||||
0.25 |
0.15 |
< 18.9 |
< 500 |
|||||||
0.45 |
0.30 |
18.9-37.9 |
500-1000 |
|||||||
0.75 |
0.50 |
37.9-94.6 |
1000-2500 |
|||||||
1.15 |
0.75 |
> 94.6 |
> 2500 |
|||||||
The penalty value was determined according to the previous section of the
table. |
The
existence of a flamed hot oil heat exchanger in the processing unit |
|||||||||
0.50 |
Processing
units including one of the following equipment: -
Compressor with power above 600 hp -
Pumps with power above 75 hp -
Mixers or rotating pumps with ability of creating exothermic reactions in
case some defects occurred -
Large rotating equipment with high rotational velocity such as centrifuges
with history of significant defects |
Rotating
equipment |
||||||||
Dow’s fire and explosion index: Dow’s fire and explosion index was calculated for each processing unit using the
following equation (3):
Fire and
explosion hazards level: In this
stage, the level of fire and explosion hazards was determined for each
processing unit according to table 3 after calculation of Dow’s index (3).
Exposure radius
and area of exposure: Using Dow’s index, the exposure
radius (ER) and area of exposure (AOE) were calculated with the following
equations (3):
Table 3: Determination of fire and explosion hazards level
Hazards level assessment (According to the 5-7th revisions) |
Dow’s F&EI index limit |
Low/slight |
1-50 |
Limited |
51-81 |
Average |
82-107 |
High/heavy |
108-133 |
Severe |
≥ 134 |
Value of
area exposed: The value of area exposed (VAE) was calculated (in
million dollars) in two forms of original value (OV) and replacement value (RV)
for each processing unit. The original value (OV) could be determined through
the multiplication of the AOE by principal original cost density (OCD) as
presented in the following equation (3):
The principal original cost density (OCD) was calculated by dividing the
investment value by the total production elements values. The investment value
can be defined as the monetary values of the physical investments in the
studied case unit, such as equipment, machines, tools, structures, and
buildings. The total values of the production elements can also be defined as
the monetary values of all elements effective on production. This parameter can
be calculated for the studied processing unit by addition of investment value
to the costs related to the labor force, consumed material, energy, and etc.
The
replacement value (RV) was also calculated using the following equation (3):
Where EF is the escalation
factor that is equal
to inflation (in the year in which the research was conducted) summed by 1. In
the present study, the inflation was considered as 15%.
Damage Factor:
The damage factor (DF) was obtained for each processing
unit by consideration of figure 1, the material factor, and F3 parameter (2,
3, 12).
Figure 1: Determination of the hazard factor
Maximum Probable
Property Damage: The value of the maximum probable
property damage (MPPD) was calculated for each processing unit by multiplication
of the value of area exposed by damage factor as presented in the following
equation (3):
Credit Factor:
The damage control credit factor (CF) was calculated with
the following equation:
Table 4: Determination of the process control factor
Row |
Description |
Process control
factor (C1) |
a |
Existence of emergency
electricity |
0.98 |
b |
Existence of cooling systems |
0.97-0.99 |
c |
Existence of explosion
control systems |
0.84-0.98 |
d |
Existence of emergency stop
systems |
0.96-0.99 |
e |
Existence of computer control |
0.93-0.99 |
f |
Incorporation of noble gases
in the process |
0.94-0.96 |
g |
Existence of operational
manuals |
0.91-0.99 |
h |
Investigation of chemical
reactions |
0.91-0.98 |
i |
Analysis of process hazards |
0.91-0.98 |
Table 5: Determination of the material separation factor
Row |
Description |
Materials separation factor (C2) |
a |
Remote
control valves |
0.96-0.98 |
b |
Waste
discharge/pressurized discharge |
0.96-0.98 |
c |
Drainage |
0.91-0.97 |
d |
Automatic
locks |
0.98 |
Where C1
is the process control factor, C2 is the material separation factor,
and C3 is the fire protection factor and its value was determined
according to tables 4, 5, and 6. Each of the factors of C1
to C3 consists of a set of safety and control measures. The process
control factor (C1) is defined as the parameter that reduces the probability
and the risk intensity of the probable fire and explosion in a processing unit.
Materials separation factor reduces the probability and the risk intensity of
the probable material fire and explosion. In addition, the fire protection
factor (C3) reduces the probability and risk intensity of probable
fire and explosion through reactive and preventive control actions. In this
stage, the effectiveness of each mentioned control and safety action was
accurately investigated on reducing the fire and explosion intensity and
probability levels. Specific values were then assigned to each of these factors
according to their limitations. It is noteworthy that no value would be
assigned to the corresponding factor if none of the mentioned control and
safety measures existed in the factors, or despite their existence, they were
not effective enough to control the losses. After determination of the control
and safety measures, their multiplication was used as the credit factor (3).
Actual maximum
probable property damage: The actual maximum
probable property damage (MPPD) (the most probable actual damage) was
determined for each processing unit using the following equation (3):
Maximum probable
days outage factor: The factor
of maximum probable days outage (MPDO) was determined by considering the MPPD
and confidence level of below 70% using the following equation:
where, X is
the actual MPPD factor (3).
Business
interruption loss factor: The business
interruption (BI) loss factor was determined (in million dollars) for each
processing unit using the following equation:
Where, VPM is
the monthly production value in million dollars (2,
3, 12-14).
Table 6: Determination of the fire protection and prevention
factor
Row |
Description |
Fire
protection and prevention factor (C3) |
a |
Existence of leakage identification
system |
0.94-0.98 |
b |
Existence of steel structures |
0.95-0.98 |
c |
Existence of water resources
for extinguishing a fire |
0.94-0.97 |
d |
Existence of special systems |
0.91 |
e |
Existence of sprinklers |
0.74-0.97 |
f |
Existence of water curtains |
0.97-0.98 |
g |
Existence of fire
extinguishing suds |
0.92-0.97 |
h |
Existence of handy fire
extinguishers |
0.93-0.98 |
i |
Existence of shields for
cables |
0.94-0.98 |
Table 7: Processing units with their materials and material factors
No. |
Processing unit |
Material/main materials |
Material factor |
Replaced material factor |
1 |
Reactor R-A |
Hydrogen, butane, ethane, and methane |
21 |
21 |
2 |
Reactor R-B |
Hydrogen, methane, and heptane |
21 |
21 |
3 |
Reactor R-C |
Hydrogen, propane, and propylene |
21 |
21 |
4 |
Tower DC1 |
Benzene, toluene, and xylene |
16 |
21 |
5 |
Tower DC2 |
Ethylene dichloride |
16 |
21 |
6 |
Tower DC3 |
Diethyl ether |
21 |
21 |
7 |
Tower AC1 |
Naphtha |
16 |
21 |
8 |
Tower AC3 |
Methyl ethyl ketone |
16 |
16 |
9 |
Furnace F3 |
Diesel fuel |
10 |
16 |
10 |
Reservoir ST1 |
Naphtha |
16 |
21 |
11 |
Reservoir ST2 |
Hydrogen |
21 |
21 |
Results
In total, 11
processing units that had adverse effects on the whole process were chosen to
be studied including reactors (R-A, R-B, and R-C), towers (DC1,
DC2, DC3, AC3, and AC3), furnace (F3),
and reservoirs (ST1 and ST2). The initial and revised
materials factors were obtained after determination of quantitative and
qualitative properties of the chemical materials for each processing unit
(Table 7). The highest material factor was obtained for Reactor R-A, Reactor
R-B, Reactor R-C, Tower DC3, and Reservoir ST2 (equal to
21), and lowest material factor was obtained for Furnace F3 (equal
to 10).
Furthermore,
the general and special process hazards (GPHs and SPHs) were identified at each
processing unit and are provided in table 8. Reactor R-B and Reactor R-C, respectively,
with 2.20 and 2.10, and Reactor R-A with 1.25 had the highest and the lowest GPH
factors, respectively. The SPH factor (F1) was calculated for each
identified hazard according to the existing manuals and Tower DC3
and Reservoir ST2 had the highest (6.80) and lowest values (4.20), respectively (Table 8). F3
(or PUHF) was determined for each processing unit and Reactor R-C (14.60) and
Reservoir ST2 (6.30) had the highest and the lowest values, respectively (Table 8).
Dow’s F&EI
and the fire and explosion hazards level are illustrated in table 8. According
to the results, Reactor R-C (306.6) and Reservoir ST1 (120) had the
maximum and minimum fire and explosion indices, respectively. Fire and
explosion hazards level was severe for all units except reservoirs ST1
and ST2; the hazards levels for these two units were high.
Table 8: Fire and explosion index and hazards level
|
General Process Hazards Factor |
Special Process Hazards Factor |
Processing Unit Hazards Factor |
Dow’s fire and explosion index |
Fire and explosion hazards level |
Reactor R-A |
1.25 |
6.75 |
8.43 |
177.03 |
Severe |
Reactor R-B |
2.20 |
5.50 |
12.10 |
254.10 |
Severe |
Reactor R-C |
2.10 |
6.95 |
14.60 |
306.60 |
Severe |
Tower DC1 |
1.50 |
4.50 |
6.75 |
141.75 |
Severe |
Tower DC2 |
1.50 |
5.50 |
8.25 |
173.25 |
Severe |
Tower DC3 |
1.50 |
6.80 |
10.20 |
214.20 |
Severe |
Tower AC1 |
1.50 |
7.85 |
11.77 |
247.17 |
Severe |
Tower AC3 |
1.50 |
6.75 |
10.12 |
161.92 |
Severe |
Furnace F3 |
1.50 |
5.50 |
8.25 |
173.25 |
Severe |
Reservoir ST1 |
1.50 |
5.00 |
7.50 |
120.00 |
High/heavy |
Reservoir ST2 |
1.50 |
4.20 |
6.30 |
132.30 |
High/heavy |
Table 9: Results of risk analysis for the processing units
|
Exposure radius |
Area of exposure |
Investment accumulation rate |
Value of area exposed |
Damage factor |
Maximum probable property damage |
Damage control credit factor |
Actual maximum probable property damage (million dollars) |
Maximum probable days outage |
Business interruption loss |
|
Original value |
Replacement value |
||||||||||
Reactor R-C |
79 |
19597 |
0.00130 |
25.47 |
24.01 |
0.83 |
19.92 |
0.58 |
11.55 |
49 |
114 |
Reactor R-B |
65 |
13266.5 |
0.00100 |
13.26 |
12.50 |
0.83 |
10.37 |
0.60 |
6.22 |
34 |
79 |
Tower AC1 |
63 |
12463 |
0.00141 |
17.57 |
16.56 |
0.83 |
13.74 |
0.62 |
8.51 |
41 |
96 |
Tower DC3 |
55 |
9498.5 |
0.00128 |
12.15 |
11.45 |
0.83 |
9.50 |
0.54 |
5.13 |
30 |
70 |
Reactor R-A |
45 |
6358.5 |
0.00125 |
7.94 |
7.48 |
0.83 |
6.30 |
0.62 |
3.84 |
25 |
58 |
Tower DC2 |
44.5 |
6218 |
0.00135 |
8.39 |
7.91 |
0.83 |
6.56 |
0.61 |
4.00 |
26 |
61 |
Furnace F3 |
44.5 |
6218 |
0.00129 |
8.02 |
7.56 |
0.83 |
6.27 |
0.63 |
3.95 |
25 |
58 |
Tower AC3 |
41 |
5278 |
0.00135 |
7.28 |
8.86 |
0.68 |
4.66 |
0.48 |
2.23 |
18 |
42 |
Tower DC1 |
36 |
4069 |
0.00140 |
5.69 |
5.36 |
0.83 |
4.44 |
0.49 |
2.17 |
18 |
50 |
Reservoir ST2 |
34 |
3630 |
0.00126 |
4.57 |
4.30 |
0.77 |
3.31 |
0.59 |
1.95 |
17 |
40 |
Reservoir ST1 |
31 |
3018 |
0.00138 |
4.16 |
3.92 |
0.65 |
2.54 |
0.51 |
1.29 |
13 |
30 |
The risk of
fire and explosion in processing units was investigated through the use of the
calculated fire and explosion index (Table 9). Based on the results, the actual
MPPDs for Reactor R-C and Reservoir ST1 were
the highest (11.55) and lowest (1.29), respectively. The MPDO was determined
for Reactor R-C (49 days). As can be observed in table 9, Furnace F3
and Tower AC3 had the maximum (0.63) and minimum (0.48) damage
control credit factor, respectively. The Actual maximum and minimum probable property were, respectively, obtained for Reactor R-C (11.55
million dollars) and Reservoir ST1 (1.29 million
dollars). Tower AC1 and Reactor R-B were at the next levels with
actual MPPDs of equal to 8.51 and 6.22 million dollars, respectively. Moreover,
maximum and minimum BI loss was obtained for Reactor R-C (114) and Reservoir ST1 (30), respectively. Maximum and minimum VAE was obtained for Reactor R-C (25.47)
and Reservoir ST1
(4.16), respectively.
The maximum and minimum investment accumulation rates (OCD) were obtained for
Tower AC1 (0.00141) and Reactor R-B (0.00100), respectively. The maximum and minimum
AOEs were that of Reactor R-C (19597) and Reservoir ST1 (3018),
respectively. Furthermore, the maximum and minimum values of ERs were obtained
for Reactor R-C (79) and Reservoir ST2 (34), respectively.
Discussion
The results
of the present study indicated that Reactor R-C had the maximum F&EI. In
addition, damage to property and production cessation days of Reactor R-B and Tower
AC1 were at the second and third levels, respectively. The F3
of Reactor R-C was equal to 14.6 which was higher than
the other units. Moreover, the F1 of this unit was 6.95 which was
the highest value after Tower AC1 (F1 = 7.85). It was
concluded that F3 and F1 can be important parameters in
determining the risks of fire and explosion hazards level. This conclusion is
in accordance with the results of researches conducted by Etowa
et al. (5) and Suardin et al. (7) who have concluded
that material usage reduction results in lower F&EI.
The obtained
indices for the studied processing units were higher than the fire and
explosion index of the isocyanate storage reservoir at
Bupal event (F&EI was equal to 238) which caused
about 2000 deaths and poisoning of 10000 individuals (13). This indicates the critical conditions of the mentioned processing units.
However, the calculated value was less than the fire and explosion index
obtained by Nezameddini et al. at an oil extraction
company which was equal to 243.68 (15). The same index was obtained as 161 in the research conducted by Gupta et
al. on an ammoniac synthesis reactor (12).
The other
processing units were ranked according to their criticality (from high to low)
as Tower DC3, Reactor R-A, Tower DC2, Furnace F3,
Tower AC3, Tower DC1, Reservoir ST2, and Reservoirs
ST1.
The results
of the study indicated that the fire and explosion hazards level were severe at
82% of the studied processing units and heavy/high at the rest of units. This
reveals the high level of fire and explosion hazards at the studied company. In
the research conducted by Jafari et al. (16), the fire and explosion hazards level was determined as severe for 75% of
the refinery Isomax unit. Results of the present
study indicated that Reactor R-C had the maximum ER of 79 m, while ER was
calculated as 41 m in the research conducted by Gupta et al. (12).
Furthermore,
the costs of probable accidents were calculated as 51 million dollars with the
induced 296 days of production cessation. The maximum cost of probable
accidents was obtained for Reactor R-C as 11.55 million dollars while the same
parameter was calculated as 21 million dollars in the research conducted by
Gupta et al. on an ammoniac synthesis reactor (12). The estimated value represents the huge economic losses due to the occurrence
of such accidents. The obtained value is the most realistic loss which is
calculated by considering the existing safety and protective operations and
equipment.
In some
studies, the F&EI is successfully used as a tool to evaluate the inherent
safety of the chemical process and it can provide a more understandable view of
the process risks. In order to reduce the F&EI in the studied processing
units, reduction of existing hazardous materials and processes operation
pressure can be useful. The results of the study by Etowa
et al. showed that when the operating pressure and the existing materials are
reduced, F&EI is reduced in accordance with the principles of inherent
immunity. However, changes in the amount of material in the processes had greater
effect on the F&EI compared with pressure changes (6).
F&EI is an important tool for the determination
of the risk of industrial processes and over time its weaknesses have been eliminated.
For example, Gupta et al. stated in their study that the current methods of F&EI
calculation not consider control measures effect on the F&EI value Therefore
this makes the industry consider more dangerous. They suggested that the
effects of lack of control measures should be included in F&EI calculation (12). In addition, Suardin et al. suggested that F&EI
can be used as a measure in the optimization of design by integrating the
F&EI in design optimization (5).
Conclusion
Results of
the present case study emphasized the existence of several weakness points at
the selected unit by determining the fire and explosion hazards of its
processing units. According to the identified hazards and parameters effective on
their occurrence, it was concluded that the control and reduction of process
hazards require incorporation of comprehensive engineering controls. Hence, Dow’s
index may be incorporated as an efficient tool by process design engineers in
achieving safe and low-hazard chemical processes. Thus, the utilization of this
index is suggested at all stages of a chemical company’s life cycle for the
prevention of fire and explosion accidents occurrence.
Acknowledgments
The authors
are grateful to all managers and staff of the studied processing company for
their cooperation in this project.
Conflict of Interest: None declared
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*
Corresponding author: Omran
Ahmadi, Dept.
of Sciences of Occupational Health, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran.
Email:
O.ahmadi@modares.ac.ir